**Historical Evidence of the ZIP Code Address Purpose**

 **From the Public Record**

**In Support of Affidavit of Noel:Kalinoski**

Page 11 of the National Area ZIP Code Directory; of 26 USC 7621; of Section 4 of the Federal Register, Volume 51, Number 53, of Wednesday, March 19, 1986, Notices at pages 9571 through 9573; of Treasury Delegation Order (TDO) 150-01; of the opinion in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 308, 98 S.Ct.2d 2357, 57 L.Ed.2d 221 (1978); of 12 USC 222; of 31 USC 103; and as a result of my actual experience, that a ZIP Code address is presumed to create a "Federal jurisdiction" or "market venue" or "revenue districts" that override State boundaries, taking one who uses such modes of address outside of a State venue and its constitutional protections and into an international, commercial venue involving admiralty concerns of the "United States", which is a commercial corporation domiciled in Washington, D.C.

More specifically, looking at the map on page 11 of the National ZIP Code Directory, e.g. at a local post office, one will see that the first digit of a ZIP Code defines an area that includes more than one State. The first sentence of the explanatory paragraph begins: "A ZIP Code is a numerical code that identifies areas within the United States and its territories for purposes of ..." [cf. 26 CFR 1.1-1(c)]. Note the singular possessive pronoun "its", not "their", therefore carrying the implication that it relates to the "United States" as a corporation domiciled in the District of Columbia (in the singular sense), not in the sense of being the 50 States of the Union (in the plural sense). The map shows all the States of the Union, but it also shows D.C., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, making the explanatory statement literally correct.

Properly construed, ZIP Codes can only be applicable in **Federal territories** and enclaves that may be located within the 50 States of the Union, and to the "United States" and District of Columbia and its territories -- cf. Piqua Bank v. Knoup, 6 Ohio 342, 404 **(1856) and U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936)** to the effect that "in every state there are two governments; the state and the United States." Therefore, ZIP Code addresses are for the corporate "United States" and its agents, for example, a customs and duty collector at New York harbor, when they move out into the States of the Union to perform functions delegated to the "United States" by the National/Federal Constitution, or the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, or a U.S. Congressman.

But, by propaganda, misleading information and seditious syntax, government has gotten nearly everyone in the 50 States of the Union to use ZIP modes of address, and that creates a PRESUMPTION or a PREJUDICIAL ADMISSION that one is in such a Federal venue, or that one is such a government agent.

In general, it is well settled in law that Income Tax Statutes apply only to corporations and to their officers, agents, and employees acting in their official capacities, e.g. from Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 44 L.Ed.2d 1, 95 S.Ct. 1538 (1975): "... However, all 'income tax statutes' apply only to state created creatures known as corporations no matter whether state, local, or federal." Since corporations act only through their officers, employees, etc., the income tax statutes reach out to them when acting in their official capacities, but not as individuals. This is the real purpose for Identifying Numbers -- cf. 26 CFR 301.6109-1(d) & (g) and 26 USC 6331(a) and 26 CFR 301.6331-1, Part 4.

Use of a ZIP Code address is tantamount to the admission of being a "citizen of the United States" who does not necessarily have the protections of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution (in the Bill of Rights) when proceeded against by Federal or State authority -- Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448 (1900), but, "All the provisions of the constitution look to an indestructible union of indestructible states", Texas vs White, 7 Wall. 700; U.S. v. Cathcart, 25 F.Case No. 14,756; In re Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Case No. 18,273 (65 C.J. Section 2) -- not known to be overturned.

1. In spite of my repeated demands that you correct the way in which you send mail to me, you insist and persist, over my most strenuous objections and contrary to my repeated NOTICES to you, to continue to send my mail with a National Area ZIP Code, which is both unnecessary, even by the application of Domestic Mail statutes and regulations, and is, in fact, an **unlawful and fraudulent** attempt to define me into an alien and foreign venue and jurisdiction that are, as a matter of fact, contrary to the Federal and State Constitutions and the case law that has developed on this issue. Briefly put, on the basis of my studies, such an address can only properly apply to Federal enclaves within the States of the Union, and perhaps to 14th Amendment citizens of the United States. For this reason alone, **you are either making a mistaken or a fraudulent presumption as to my status.** **How would you prefer to be classified: as one who made an error? or one who has committed acts of fraud**? If it is fraudulent, then you are also engaged in a conspiracy against me and mine. All such mail is reviewed without prejudice but not accepted.

2. My use of the term "without prejudice, UCC 1-207/UCC1-308" in connection with my signature on this document, or any prior document or instrument, indicates that I have exercised the remedy provided for me in the Uniform Commercial Code, Article I, Section 207 new 308, whereby I have reserved my natural and common law right not to be compelled to perform under any contract, commercial agreement, or bankruptcy that I did not enter knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, and reserved all other Uniform Commercial Code and common law remedies. It also indicates that I do not intend to ratify any fraudulently induced contract by continued acceptance of the benefits thereof. Furthermore, it notifies all administrative agencies of government that I do not and will not accept the liability associated with the compelled benefit of any unrevealed contract, commercial agreement or bankruptcy.

3. Briefly put, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) Section 111.2 and the copyrighted (hence, "private" and not governmental at all) NATIONAL AREA ZIP CODE DIRECTORY, page 11, both identify the term "United States" by using the third person, singular, personal pronoun "its", which relates only to the "United States" at the District of Columbia, its territories and ceded enclaves, its agents and its "citizens". In this context, the term "citizen of United States" has a very restricted definition -- cf. 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c) and 301.6109(g); 42 U.S.C. 1981 & 1982; 26 U.S.C. 3121(e); 26 U.S.C. 7701(a)(9) & (10); etc. It is to be noted that in DMM 111.2, the term "United States" is used, but none of the fifty states as the States in the Union is mentioned; therefore, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (mention of one thing implies the exclusion of others) becomes applicable. The 1789 Federal/National Constitution always makes a distinction between the "States in the Union" and the "United States", the former always being referenced in the plural, and the latter sometimes being so referenced. The "United States" has no venue or jurisdiction within unceded territories inside the "States in the Union" (e.g. see Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221, 223 (1845); New Orleans v. U.S., 35 U.S.(10 Pet.) 662, 737 (1836); 4 U.S.C. 72; 48 U.S.C. Chapters 2 and 3, "The Alaska and Hawaii Omnibus Acts"; 18 U.S.C., Appendix, FRCrP Rules 1 and 54(c); etc.) except where a man or a corporation can be presumed to be a "citizen of the United States" (see 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(a), (b) and (c)), or a "Federal citizen", or a "National citizen" (see U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982), stating that National("United States") citizenship mandates Social Security participation, but the issues of jurisdiction and venue were not raised in that case, and it was argued on narrow and inappropriate statutory grounds -- cf. the dissent in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 65 L.Ed.2d 555, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980), pages 30-31 especially).

 "All legislation is prima facie territorial."

[American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.]

[213 U.S. 347, 356-357 (1909)]

"Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the law-making power has jurisdiction."

[New York Central R.R. Co. v. Chisholm]

[268 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1925)]

... [T]he "canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States ...."

[U.S. v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 222]

[70 S.Ct. 10 (1949)]

4. Without getting into the several definitions of the term "citizen", which the courts generally construe to mean a mere civil status for one who is politically involved, McCafferty vs Guyer, 59 Pa. 109, 126-127 (Agnew dissent), etc., but sometimes the term is limited to a representative of a city in Parliament, or one who is involved in the conduct and policy making of a civil government, the following is certain authority on the subject for those who are in that category. Persons who are "citizens of the United States" do not necessarily have all the protections of the first eight amendments to the U.S. Constitution when proceeded against by federal and state authorities (e.g., see Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 20 S.Ct. 448(1900)). One of the elements that can lead to such presumptions, by inference, is the acceptance of mail with a ZIP code mode of address. In Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671-672(1944), the U.S. supreme Court has ruled that there are three recognized meanings for the term "United States", to wit:

The term "United States" may be used in any one of several senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the states which are united by and under the Constitution.6

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6. See Langdell, "The Status of our New Territories," 12 Harvard Law Review 365, 371; see also Thayer, "Our New Possessions," 12 Harvard Law Review 464; Thayer, "The Insular Tariff Cases in the Supreme Court," 15 Harvard Law Review 164; Littlefield, "The Insular Cases," 15 Harvard Law Review 169, 281.

But, those three meanings are simply evidence of the word games that the courts, legislatures and bureaucrats have played with the minds and rights of the freemen in this country. See also the clear admission in Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855).

5. The map on page 11 of the ZIP CODE DIRECTORY indicates that ZIP code denominators combine more than one of the States of the Union, hence they define a special venue related to revenue districts established, for example, by 26 U.S.C. 7621(a) and (b), and those are the only legitimate purposes for such a mode of address. For instance, the ZIP codes that denominate certain areas in the States of New York and Pennsylvania all use a five digit ZIP code, the first numeral of which begins with a "1", e.g. "19600". On page 15, ibid., a list is given of state abbreviations with **two capital letters,** to be used in conjunction with ZIP codes.

6. Contrary to popular belief, "citizenship of the United States" arises from the so-called 14th Amendment, and did not exist before that fraudulent enactment was foisted on the unsuspecting free men (see Utah v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (1975); Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 272 (1968); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 et seq. (1947); Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 1855); Van Valkenberg v. Brown, 43 Cal. 43, 47 (1872); U.S. v. Anthony, 24 Fed. Case No. 14,459 at 830 (1873); Cory et al. v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 349-350, 17 Am. Rep. 738 (1874); Sharon v. Hill, 26 Fed. Reporter 337 at 343-344; State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144, 152; Arver v. U.S., 245 U.S. 366, 388-89(1917); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 509 (1938)). In fact, such statutory provisions as 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982, now codified in the same title of the U.S. Codes as the Social Security Act (so called), still clearly make a distinction between "citizen of the United States" and "white state citizen". It is also clear from various other authorities that there is a distinction between state citizenship for whites and 14th Amendment citizenship of the United States, since even such a distinction can be drawn from the language of the infamous 14th Amendment itself. In Cory v. Carter, supra, quoting and basing its analysis on the opinion in the Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, the court, with respect to the First Section, said:

"... [I]t overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt." ... It recognizes and establishes a "distinction between citizenship of the United States and citizenship of a State."

[emphasis added]

However, with reference to the second clause, that same opinion continues:

This clause does not refer to citizens of the States. It embraces only citizens of the United States. It leaves out the words "citizen of the State," which is so carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the United States, in the preceding sentence. It places the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and leaves the privileges and immunities of citizens of a State under the protection of the State constitution. This is fully shown by the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.

[emphasis added]

7. There are lots of reasons to believe, e.g. by an examination of 42 U.S.C. 1982 (which distinguishes between "citizens of the United States" and "white state citizens"), that Taney's dicta in the Dred Scott case was not really overturned by the 14th Amendment, and lots of authorities to show that it was never validly adopted or ratified and that, in fact, the 14th Amendment did not repeal any part of the original 1789 Constitution for the United States of America.

**Therefore, please state concisely, with supporting points, rationale and authority: What are the underlying presumptions by which you send me mail using such a mode of address?**